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Abstract
This essay argues that the ‘materiality’ of life and law are today technological artefacts of a biopolitical
project, and that sexual-reproductive and legislative boundaries are the boundaries around which power
coheres and materializes—making life law’s matter, an effect that is slyly taken up as legal ‘cause’. I offer
as case studies readings of two incommensurable texts: Milan Kundera’s political fiction, The Joke, and
the contemporary fertility industry, an instantiation of biopolitical techno-science. Bringing into tension
the ‘materiality’ of life and law across these two sites, I hope to surface some of the vernaculars of
(bio)political power—rhetorical matters of historical, political, socioeconomic, and technological concern
that nevertheless claim the objectivity of ‘matter’. Both texts also concern reproduction—sexual, artificial,
cultural, political—and how it is used to promote a certain ideology of citizenship and to regulate political
‘freedoms’. While Kundera’s novel, written in the 1960s, represents a critique of ‘old’ materialism as the
reproduction of Communist State power, here, in juxtaposition, Kundera’s fiction occasions my critique of
(legal) ‘new’ materialism—as neoliberal and biopolitical investment in the speculative futures proffered by
the fertility industry.
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A Rhetorical Matter of Life and
Law: The Speculative Futures of
(Bio)political Reproduction
Stuart J. Murray
1 Introduction
If this essay were to address a legal or juridical object, that object would
be life itself. And if I concerned myself with law’s power over life, in a
particular time or place, according to a specific piece of legislation or
judgment, I would certainly fail to address life—as matter, as object, or
otherwise—and how life matters for us. Life is not just what we are—
as living beings—or what we hold in common with other living things;
life holds moral value for us, it conditions—and it is the condition
of—law or any legal materialization, any materiality. This contribution
does not take a legal or juridical ‘object’, but rather enquires into the
rhetorical and mediatized conditions of possibility for ‘life’ to appear as
a legal ‘matter’—a matter that wears the mantle of a certain objectivity.
And it does. I write in the context of a spate of harrowing U.S. legislation
enacted to restrict women’s reproductive rights, frequently voiced in
the name of life. How such life matters—and whose lives matter—is
here as elsewhere perhaps as much about religious belief and political
ideology as it is about biology, citizenship, women’s rights, men’s rights,
the rights of the unborn, and so on. Indeed, ‘life’ is at once the most
molecular of phenomena and the most angelic; but law, too, has many
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faces, many points of application and production. In what follows, I
take ‘law’ and ‘life’ as capacious terms in correspondence—part of the
wider rhetorical and media-ecological context for the (re)production
of human subjectivity. To invoke several lines from Derrida (1991),
this wider context should be understood as ‘everything that links the
“subject” to conscience, to humanity, to history … and above all to
the law, as subject subjected to the law, subject to the law in its very
autonomy, to ethical or juridical law, to political law or power, to order
(symbolic or not)…’ (99). To these many faces of law we must add the
biopolitical technologies that (re)mediate each of these intersecting
and ramified fields of subjectivation.

Lives—whether factual or fictional—are undoubtedly conscripted
by law, sites of law’s many applications and productions; and yet ‘life’
also conscripts law in significant ways. Whatever the term signifies and
however it matters for us, ‘life’ mutates historically, politically, according
to fashion, and circulates memetically in and across our media networks.
Law is subject to this fluidity, I contend. Far from a sovereign power
whose prerogative is to ‘take life or let live’, increasingly law and life
are technological artefacts of biopolitical power—a power that ‘makes
live and lets die’ (Foucault 2003). This paper offers readings of two
‘case studies’ or, rather, ‘sites’—one factual, one fictional—and brings
them into correspondence. In doing so, I hope to surface some of the
vernaculars of biopolitical power, across law and life—rhetorical matters
of historical, political, socioeconomic, and technological concern that
nevertheless claim the objectivity or materiality of ‘fact’. Both sites
index the circulation and (re)production of power, one focusing on the
fertility industry as an instantiation of biopolitical techno-science, the
other through a piece of political fiction written by Milan Kundera in
the mid-1960s. Drawing on the work of Derrida (1987), I read both
sites through the conceit of the ‘postcard’—a trope whose transmission
is neither quite public nor private, subject to fictionalizations as well
as factual repercussions. While Kundera’s novel, The Joke, has little
to do with the fertility industry as we know it, it nonetheless speaks
to political production and reproduction, blurring the public and the
private, and enlisting them as regulative matters of moral law, political
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law, power, and social order (symbolic or not). The fictional genre has
the added benefit of providing us some critical distance—temporally,
politically, geographically—from which we might ref lect on the
political powers, and ruses, of our contemporary moment. But more
than this: Kundera’s novel stages a critique of the political atrocities of
an ‘old’ materialism, in its Communist zeal to abolish private property.
This resonates uncannily, I suggest, with neoliberal ‘new’ materialism
and its ideological ‘privatization’ of life, as we see in the fertility
industry. This essay is situated in the dissonant spaces between these
two political ideologies, legal regimes, and instantiations of ‘life itself ’.
My claim throughout is that the ‘materiality’ of law and life are
today technological artefacts of a biopolitical project, and that sexualreproductive and legislative boundaries are the boundaries around
which power coheres and materializes—making life law’s matter, an
effect that is slyly taken up as legal cause. I am interested in biopolitical
technologies and the regulation of ‘life’ for a number of intersecting
reasons, which are fleshed out in the tensions and juxtapositions of
my two ‘sites’. Both ‘sites’ concern reproduction—sexual, artificial,
cultural, political—and how it is used to promote a certain ideology of
citizenship and to regulate political ‘freedoms’. Power in this guise is
less about a coherent raison d’état in the model of top-down governance
or will-to-power, signalling instead diffuse technologies d’état that are
today overwhelmingly privatized, highly mediatized, and driven by
neoliberal ideology. My deepest concern is that the ‘materialities’ of
law and life are defined in advance through (bio)political and technoscientific rhetorics—defined in advance, or better, as an advance on
(and investment in) the ‘hopeful’ futures that are meant to seem within
our wilful grasp today.

This essay first introduces the trope of the ‘postcard’ (Derrida
1987) as a (re)productive figure in generative transmission. Alongside
Derrida’s ‘postcard’ it then reads the postcard that is pivotal to the
plot of Kundera’s political novel. It then turns to select ‘postcards’
from the fertility industry to advance a critical political argument
about the manipulation of hope in the speculative futures of neoliberal
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techno-science. Drawing on my correspondent readings of both ‘sites’,
the following section addresses the rhetorical matter of law and life,
arguing that new (legal) materialisms falter in at least two related ways:
temporally and rhetorically. That is, the concept of (legal) materiality
cannot quite account for speculative futurity or for the generative
agency of its own language, which, I contend, rhetorically constitutes
legal materiality without itself being a legal ‘matter’. The final section
returns in refrain to my juxtaposed sites to offer a close reading of two
juxtaposing scenes from Kundera’s novel. I argue for the significance
of these juxtapositions for the biopolitical understanding of fertility
in today’s neoliberal milieu. My argumentative style in this essay is
to write through fiction, rather than in a strictly propositional form:
this is a performative gesture that refuses to close up the space—the
‘void’—between my two ‘sites’ and to permit their ethical collision.
2 Postcards
Throughout The Post Card, Derrida admits his obsession with a certain
postcard that served both as occasion and writing ‘material’ for his own
postcards from Oxford to Paris in 1977–78, and for his own reading
and ‘raving’, as he puts it—la délire, or the ‘unreading’—of its scene,
which he confesses he finds ‘obscene’ (see Figure 1). The image depicts
Plato standing closely behind Socrates, who is seated at a scrivener’s
table. The placement of the philosophers inverts the conventional and
longstanding relation between master and disciple: we have been taught
that Socrates spoke whereas Plato later fictionalized Socrates’s speech,
his life and death, in writing. No surprise that Derrida was delighted
to find such an artefact. His comments on this postcard—written on
countless copies of them—are worth glossing in this context: ‘I tell you’,
Derrida writes, ‘that I see Plato getting an erection in Socrates’ back and
see the insane hubris of his prick, an interminable, disproportionate
erection … sliding, still warm, under Socrates’ right leg’ (1987: 18). The
insane hubris involves the ‘emission of sense or of seed’, Plato’s power
over Socrates through his writings (themselves ‘postcards’ of sorts), and
the power of the written word across our media ecologies of production
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and reproduction. ‘Imagine the day’, Derrida continues,
that we will be able to send sperm by post card, without going through
a check drawn on some sperm bank, and that it remains living enough
for the artificial insemination to yield fecundation, and even desire.
(1987: 24)

Figure 1: Plato and Socrates, the frontispiece of Prognostica Socratis
basilei (13th c.), by Matthew Paris

We are meant to imagine that this day has arrived, and as I
argue below, the fertility industry materializes Derrida’s metaphor.
The postcard itself is a curious reproduction of a frontispiece from
a thirteenth-century fortune-telling book—an early technology of
speculative futures. Writing from one such future, and reflecting
on this image, Derrida suggests that the postcard—in its specificity,
but also as metaphor—inverts the generational transmission that we
have always held as true. The ‘charter’ or the ‘contract’, ‘which quite
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stupidly one has to believe’, writes Derrida, runs as follows: ‘Socrates
comes before Plato, there is between them—and in general—an order
of generations, an irreversible sequence of inheritance’ (1987: 20). And
yet this ‘irreversible’ sequence, the temporality of generation, is as it
were inverted by the technologies of (re)production, old and new. The
alternations take their turns. And yet this intermediation is difficult
to grasp, as N. Katherine Hayles (2005) writes:
The contemporary indoctrination into linear causality is so strong
that it continues to exercise a fatal attraction for much contemporary
thought. It must be continually resisted if we are fully to realize the
implications of multicausal and multilayered hierarchical systems,
which entail distributed agency, emergent processes, unpredictable
coevolutions, and seemingly paradoxical interactions between
convergent and divergent processes. (31)

A temporal destabilization of generational relations, of genetic code
and moral code, would be dismissed by staunch materialists as a joke.
But any joke is in the timing and the telling—in its transmission, its
reception, and (especially) everything in-between.
Derrida’s postcard imposed itself on me as I read Milan Kundera’s
1967 novel, The Joke (1992), in which the plot hinges on the reception
(or interception) of a postcard intended as a joke. In the 1960s, this book
had for two years been kept from publication in Prague by Communist
censorship, not for its inclusion of a fictional postcard, but for the
political message it implied despite its status as a work of fiction or a
‘joke’. On my reading, and in my use of Kundera’s fiction here, The Joke
helps us to read our contemporary political moment, and to take some
critical distance from it. The novel’s fervent young protagonist, Ludvik,
a student leader in the Communist Party, finds himself, to his horror,
‘excommunicated’ from the Party, expelled from university, socially
ostracized, and imprisoned for many years in a labour camp for writing
a postcard—a joke—to his would-be girlfriend, Marketa. Marketa was
away at a two-week Party training course, a summer retreat intended to
indoctrinate students in the tactics of the revolutionary movement. Her
political zeal ostensibly fortified, she wrote to Ludvik full of gushing
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enthusiasm for the programme, praising the early-morning calisthenics,
the talks, and the ‘healthy atmosphere’. This may have been a coded
script. But Ludvik, infatuated and naïve and sexually frustrated (a selfconfessed ‘skirt-chaser’), was overcome with jealousy and sullen that
she was not with him. ‘I quite agreed with what she said’, he narrates,
I too believed in the imminence of a revolution in Western Europe;
there was only one thing I could not accept: that she should be so
happy when I was missing her so much. So I bought a postcard and
(to hurt, shock, and confuse her) wrote: ‘Optimism is the opium of the
people! A healthy atmosphere stinks of stupidity! Long live Trotsky!
Ludvik’. (1992: 34)1

Is this message a matter of libidinal cathexis, insane hubris, phallic
emission, or something else? Joke or no joke, its delivery misfires, and
its misdelivery is incendiary.

Ludvik’s postcard is intercepted and scrutinized. What follows
might be described in today’s terms as a right-wing troll storm, using
a Party platform and mobilizing media connections. Shunned and
demonized by his former comrades, Ludvik finds himself interrogated
by the District Party Secretariat, and eventually defending himself in
what proves to be a kangaroo court. They recite to him his postcard to
Marketa, to which he replies, ‘Comrades, it was meant to be funny’.
‘Do you consider it funny? one of the Comrades asked the other two.
Both shook their heads’. Ludvik protests, ‘it was just a few sentences,
a joke, I didn’t give it a second thought. If I’d meant anything bad by
it, I wouldn’t have sent it to a Party training course!’ ‘How you wrote
it is immaterial’, his Comrades respond. ‘Whether you wrote it quickly
or slowly, in your lap or at a desk, you could only have written what
was inside you. That and nothing else’ (37–38).
Kundera’s lines above strike me as profoundly contemporary: the
truth of fiction in direct correspondence with the fiction of our truth.
We might parse these lines in the language of identity politics, where
one’s identity authorizes in advance—and demands—a certain speech
and action, and conversely, where one’s speech/acts are always already
inexorably tied to one’s identity, and subject either to privilege or a
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police-function, approbation or admonition. Lauren Berlant (1999)
describes identity politics as a ‘feeling politics’, a direct correspondence
between affect and truth: ‘the notion that the feeling self is the true
self, the self that must be protected from pain or from history, that
scene of unwelcome changing’ (56). The postcard is material evidence
of desires ‘inside you’ that cannot be disavowed—that and nothing
else. Nobody ‘gets’ the joke because it is on them: pious obedience to
the Party line can be no laughing matter, or, in more contemporary
terms, one’s identity can be no joke, an emission of sense or of seed: it
must be reproduced, disseminated, in the vulgar credos of the day. In
the postcard, on it, the public and the private enter into confusion and,
ultimately, fusion. Ludvik says, ‘I came to realize that there was no
power capable of changing the image of my person lodged somewhere
in the supreme court of human destinies; that this image (even though
it bore no resemblance to me) was much more real than my actual self;
that I was its shadow and not it mine’ (50). This is a socialist aphorism
and an identity politics. Another of Kundera’s characters describes a
more ardent Communist comrade: ‘he never tired of repeating that
the new man differed from the old insofar as he had abolished the
distinction between public and private life’ (17). As I suggest in the
next section, this distinction has been abolished for us by virtue of
biopolitical technologies, (social) media, and a neoliberal ethic.
3 (Re)producing hope
Consider for a moment what I shall call digital ‘postcards’ from
representatives of the fertility industry—several random screenshots
gathered from websites discovered through simple Google searches.
Figures 2 and 3 hail from India: take note of the complexion of hope
and happiness that each purveys. As Valerie Hartouni (1997) has noted,
fertility and motherhood are predominantly represented as white (45),
though increasingly this is a matter of reproductive tourism, appealing
to a clientele themselves imagined to be western and white.
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Figure 2: Screenshot from www.ivfgenetics.in

Figure 3: Screenshot from www.fertility-clinic.in.

Figure 4: Screenshot from www.christcenteredmama.com.
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Hope and/as life are inscribed in the Christian-evangelical fertility
narrative as well, with messaging resembling a postcard or partisan
placard (see Figure 4). The examples are legion and could be multiplied.
It is from within this media ecology, I argue, that we must read the
fertility industry, its hopes and potential harms. For the technoscientific aspirations of fertility do not stand in isolation from the
innumerable mediatizations of race and face, of desirable futures,
of citizenship, of law and liberal human rights discourse, or of the
myriad value scripts that shore up and normalize a certain neoliberal
biopolitics, an ontology by which some will be ‘made’ to live, brought
to life and light, while others will be left to perish on the dark margins
of technological ‘progress’.
Herein lies the differential and discriminatory power ‘to make
live and let die’, Michel Foucault’s (2003) well-known definition for
biopolitics. All lives do not matter, it would seem, or their matter and
mattering do not obey the same scripts: some will be made to live,
others left to die. As Kafka once quipped, ‘There is plenty of hope—
only not for us’. It is hardly remarkable, then, that fertility clinics
capitalize (on) a hope as ostensibly innocent as a child’s, but selectively
destined for and marketed globally to a clientele who can afford fertility
services. Each ‘postcard’ bears distinct addresses and addressees. In
Cornelia Vismann and Markus Krajewski’s terms, they are ‘transfer
media’, which are legal in their own right: ‘Law relies on transfer
media and yet is itself a transfer system; it transfers rights’ (2007: 91).
However, I understand these media not simply as transferential nodes
in an economy of (legal) rights. Rather, they wield the rhetorical and
transitive power to produce subjects of rights, subjectivity, or legal
standing ‘before the law’, to invoke Kafka once again. Polyvocal and
itinerant across our media ecologies, these ‘postcards’—much like the
services they advertise—are agentic technologies, shaping postures,
attitudes, expectations, desires, and perceptions. They are relational yet
not necessarily causally related; it is difficult to trace their interstitial
effects, repercussions, and pedagogies. They are not simply unrelated
snapshots lacking frame or context. They constitute, rather, a fictional
exchange within a wider marketplace of speech/acts that perform—in
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and as correspondence—a certain hope and, often, a nostalgia that hails
us, offering discrete yet syncretizing sites of affective identification.

In my small selection of ‘postcards’, just as with Derrida’s and
Kundera’s, it is as if the effect ontologically precedes the cause. In
other words, that which is artefactual and counterfactual appears as a
priori materiality or fact. Much as Plato’s writings generate Socrates,
or Ludvik’s postcard predestines him as the political enemy he will
become, for each fertility industry ‘postcard’ there is a corresponding
addressee who is already conscripted, mobilized, and haunted in and
by that address—even as this mobilization and generation are eclipsed,
obscuring their agentic and generative traces. For the claim here is not
simply about biological reproduction, but rather about the reproduction
of reproduction itself, and how this matter is transmitted, instilled, and
symbolized as ‘hope’, or, in the fullness of time, as future-matters of
legal custody, genealogy, inheritance, filiation, objecthood. As Derrida
writes (once again a postcard), ‘A child is what one should not be able
to “send” oneself. It never will be, never should be a sign, a letter, even
a symbol’ (1987: 25). Every loving parent locked in a custody battle for
their child knows the pain of legal objecthood. And yet the fertility
industry materializes precisely here, in this space.
Under neoliberal biopolitics, as under communism, we might
say, optimism or hope is what matters, making of life a publicprivate partnership. Both political regimes seem to converge on this
revolutionary promise, on its utopian futures, and though their means
of arriving there diverge markedly, this is serious business: ‘no great
movement designed to change the world can bear sarcasm or mockery’
(242), we read from one of Kundera’s characters. In our contemporary
context, the fertility industry provides a key case study in the solemn yet
speculative futures of making matter, making life, and making living
matter (see Figure 5). The abdication of optimism or hope is anathema:
hope is a biopolitical diktat, a happy future inscribed into the technoscientific and marketized ruses of progress, a marketing slogan repeated
across fertility blogs, by clinics, right down to hope-inspired apparel
and accessories produced for fertility-industry mothers and babies. In
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recent years, hope itself has also been materialized, biomedicalized, its
absence pathologized: consider the burgeoning psychological ‘science
of hope’, with ostensibly evidence-based interventions that include
empiricist ‘hope scales’ and ‘hope therapy’ (e.g., see Gallagher and
Lopez 2017). Temporally, it represents what Jack Halberstam (2005)
calls ‘ReproTime’, a temporization that figures as both natural and
desirable: the ‘normative scheduling of daily life (early to bed, early to
rise) that accompanies the practice of child rearing’ (5).

Figure 5: Screenshot from www.fertilefuture.ca

From within the temporal inscriptions of futurity, of promise—from
within this counterfactual future—we are not meant to dwell on the
opportunity costs, the collateral damages, or negative externalities of
‘making live’, as if doing so could only signal the monstrous repudiation
of life itself. And yet, these injunctions notwithstanding, sometimes
hope does not materialize, and desire does not yield fecundation. Despite
the egg-freezing cocktail parties, flexible finance plans, aggressive
marketing, blogs and social networks, current success rates are based
on probability modelling and there are little concrete data; indeed,
there are little data on any long-term health consequences for mothers
and none for their offspring. ‘Hope’ seems to stand in for the absence
of facts, or stands in as fact.
The serial fertility ‘postcards’, themselves fertile sites and rites of
passage, are material instantiations, salvos—as material as the clinics
and fertility treatments themselves—working in and on and around
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bodies conscripted to emit a hope that is always and only impossibly
immaterial, even when that hope bears fruit. For what is hoped-for,
what comes to life and comes to matter, if it does, is not hope itself,
despite the industry’s metonymic slippage between hope and the child,
means and end, cause and effect (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Screenshot from www.newhopefertility.com

If the child were hope’s material object and objective, then hope
too would be (its) matter. The fruits of these labours are sometimes
referred to as ‘hope babies’ (or ‘rainbow babies’ if the birth happens
after a miscarriage, stillborn, or neonatal death). In this metonymy,
infancy and childhood are fetishized as innocent and pure, a matter
of cultural projection and cathexis. As Lee Edelman (2004) remarks,
the child represents ‘variously sentimentalized cultural identifications,
has come to embody for us the telos of the social order and come to
be seen as the one for whom that order is held in perpetual trust’ (11).
We might well be, understandably, nostalgic for the postcard’s
delivery, even before it arrives, inducted into the loss of what will (not)
have been, with the promises of techno-science available, for a price, to
secure this future today. Here is figured the reproductive body (mater,
or ‘mother’) as matter and matter-ing, both biologically and through
the cultural performatives of optimism or hope. If we believe industry
messaging, we are expected to concede the perverse materialism of the
reproductive body, ‘priceless’ yet rendered as human (venture) capital
to be realized, in sense and in seed. This suggests, as Michael Warner
(1991) phrases it, ‘a relation to self that finds its proper temporality and
fulfillment in generational transmission’ (9). But who or what, after all,
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is the destinataire—the addressee—of hope’s address? What destiny
or density lies in futures ‘held in perpetual trust’? Fertility industry
‘postcards’ are as much material as materiel—the aggregate of objects
required to run a business (distinguished from its personnel or human
face), but also munitions for battle in the culture wars. Together, the
‘postcards’ constitute a repertoire of images that shore up and imprint,
or materialize, the (dollar) value of ‘life’.
Foucault (2008) employs a telling example in his assessment of
American neoliberalism and ‘human capital’. It is worth citing at length:
the neo-liberals tried to explain, for example, how the mother-child
relationship, concretely characterized by the time spent by the mother
with the child, the quality of the care she gives, the affection she shows,
the vigilance with which she follows its development, its education, and
not only its scholastic but also its physical progress, the way in which
she not only gives it food but also imparts a particular style to eating
patterns, and the relationship she has with its eating, all constitute
for the neo-liberals an investment which can be measured in time.
And what will this investment constitute? It will constitute a human
capital, the child’s human capital, which will produce an income.
What will this income be? It will be the child’s salary when he or she
becomes an adult. And what will the income be for the mother who
made the investment? Well, the neo-liberals say, it will be a psychical
income. (243–44)

The matter and measure of time and of (future) capital become
increasingly speculative, increasingly vigilant and anxious, within the
temporalities of the fertility industry. The would-be parent’s ‘psychical
income’ demands an investment in hope but also often a capital
investment in the fertility industry. But rather than ‘income’ in the strict
sense, now or for tomorrow, ‘hope’ here is mattered and measured in
economies of psychical and material debt, and sometimes failure. They
are fictional economies, (re)produced and propped up by an industry that
hopes most to profit, to reap a return-on-investment. Hope, too, much
like the stock market, has become deregulated, virtual, outside of legal
jurisdiction. Much of the fertility industry operates in a legal grey zone
without even the instruments of ‘soft law’ (guidelines, accreditation,
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regulated data collection, reporting). But this also suggests law’s failure
to imagine—and to regulate—the profoundly speculative futures of
neoliberalism, the temporality of generation, whether this represents
the transpersonal generation of future wealth, a future child, or, stated
more obliquely, a future held in perpetual trust, venture ‘capital’ hostage
to ‘hopeful’ biotechnologies.2 For an increasing number of U.S. states, it
is no contradiction whatsoever that the law should intervene to regulate
and restrict women’s reproductive freedoms (e.g., through ‘personhood’
initiatives), including the availability of pregnancy termination: here,
too, a certain ‘life’ is understood, cultivated and exalted, according to
differential political and ideological calculi—all of which suggests that
law’s silence on the fertility industry has little to do with law’s interest
in securing someone’s ‘freedom to choose’, and more to do with how
law has been conscripted by a certain techno-political understanding
of ‘life itself ’.
4 On matter and method
New materialist scholars typically situate themselves somewhere in
relation to ‘matter’ and ‘discourse’, sometimes negotiating the terms
of their correspondence, or charting a path between empiricism and
relativism, realism and idealism. But my ‘object’ (if that is what it is) does
not quite yield to the micropolitics of such binarity—nor to the ‘binary
mode’ of either algorithm or law—‘the mode of decision-making’
(Vismann and Krajewski 2007: 91), which materializes in its own way
and obscures the temporizing persuasions of circularity and circuitry,
whose densities, we might say, verge on the immaterial. If this paper
wades into the emissions of sense or of seed, then, it is not to pick a side
or to propose yet another way that matter is discourse, or vice versa, but
to think through some of the presuppositions that these terms tend to
secrete and reproduce. I agree with Kang and Kendall’s ‘legal materialist
approach’ inasmuch as it ‘takes care not to collapse into either a
materialist determinism or a hermeneutic self-referentiality’; however,
I am less certain how ‘a legal materialist mode of inquiry mediates
between these two poles…’ (Kang and Kendall, Introduction: 5).
Mediation is at stake, certainly, and yet I’m not certain that these two
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poles occupy opposite ends of a single continuum; and if there are
ruptures or discontinuities between them, these frustrate attempts to
negotiate a mediation.

My thesis, then, is mindful of ruptures and discontinuities, which
I have tried to stage here through the readings of my ‘sites’ as well
as in their juxtaposition(s). In this respect, (legal) new materialism
falters in at least two, related, ways: temporally and rhetorically. First,
temporally, with respect to hoped-for futures cast in the speculative
temporality of techno-science: this is a future that often does not
materialize, and while it relies on material practises in the present (e.g.,
capital investments in hormone treatments, the freezing of embryos or
blastocysts), these practises are not ‘materializations’ of future hopes or
even psychical ‘investments’. It is only by a reifying sleight of hand, by
conjuring, that we speak of the (materialist) ‘agencies’ of future-matters
that do not yet or may never exist. The future always holds its own
secrets, and future-matters always belong to the future, in its rupturable
and discontinuous coming-into-being. If, then, as Kang (2018) states,
‘Legal matters need to be situated’ (456), what might it mean to ‘situate’
matters temporally rather than spatially? And if we did, how would
we begin with our ‘ontological qualifications’ (462) of them? And it is
here, I suspect, that we glimpse law’s bias: its sovereign jurisdictions
rely on precedential appeals to the past, whereas neoliberal biopolitics
and techno-science project onto future-oriented counterfactuals, in
a fictional time to-come rather than in a ‘concrete’ place. As Derrida
says, we are obliged ‘de laisser de l’avenir à l’avenir’—‘to let the future
have a future’ (Derrida and Stiegler 2002: 85), or, to leave some of the
future to what is still to come.3
Second, rhetorically, (legal) new materialism as a methodological
or analytic apparatus does not quite appreciate the immaterial force of
language and rhetorical tropes, and in particular, fictional language.
And this is so, ironically, even as it relies on language, tropology, and
fiction. What, after all, is the ‘materiality’ of the allegory, the metaphor,
or the metonym, which ruptures reference, and is discontinuous
with propositional logic? The ‘ joke’, too, as Kundera so artfully
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demonstrates, cuts in more than one way. Rhetorical ambivalence and
equivocation are essential and cannot be outstripped; I would wish to
amplify their significance in ways that disorient ‘new materialisms’
and ‘object-oriented ontologies’. As Kang (2018) rightly points out,
‘it is extremely difficult to make the forces which hold and move
matters “appear,” let alone to interpret them’ (454). Perhaps this is why
new materialists tend to privilege examples derived from molecular
biology, physics, and chemistry, but rarely from rhetoric. And yet
the force of law relies on performative speech acts, which, according
to J. L. Austin (1962), are illocutions that say what they do and do
what they say. And to complicate matters, there are rhetorical tropes,
which sometimes do more or otherwise than they say and say more or
otherwise than (what) they do. ‘Appearances’ are deceiving. Even our
everyday words sometimes lack any material referents, as they must.
After all, there is no matter for ‘love’ or for what ‘matters’, for, love is
not some prior possession I have to give; nor does its giving—for I am
given in that giving—secure any return to sender: speech/act, actingout, actualization, it’s immaterial. (This shares in the ‘old’ materialist
critique of private property). What matters is, rather, called forth.
And thankfully, the ambivalence of the call, its precariousness, also
cannot be outstripped. As Derrida puts it in one of his ‘postcards’—his
envois—‘and when I call you my love, my love, is it you I am calling
or my love?’ (1987: 8).
Writing through fiction, my approach in this essay invokes the
ambivalence of the fugue, derived from fugere and fugare (‘to flee’
and ‘to pursue’). It is meant to suggest a polyphonic composition that
echoes across our media ecologies and appears again in the form of
Kundera’s novel itself, both in Ludvik’s ‘fugue states’ (psychologically)
and in the importance of folk music for him, its call-and-response, its
weightless densities and histories, its power ‘to create through the music
a protective enclosure in the midst of the rowdy drunks, like a glass
cabin suspended in the cold depths of the sea’ (315). This sentence, its
simile, its imagery, and its sense are nonsense without figurative flights
of language. As I elaborate below, the ‘subject’ and ‘speech’ are for me
purposefully ambivalent as I navigate the spaces—the void—between
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my two ‘sites’ and their juxtaposition(s). As Foucault (1998) writes:
‘The “subject” of literature (what speaks in it and what it speaks about)
is less language in its positivity than the void that language takes as
its space when it articulates itself in the nakedness of “I speak”’ (149).

And so my two ‘sites’—one factual, one f ictional—at least
ostensibly—are less ‘case studies’ in their own right than they are
in their juxtaposition(s), in the void, the space-between—a space
to think—the ethical collisions between the fertility industry and
Kundera’s political-literary fiction, The Joke. The void ‘object’, then,
comes at us obliquely, in the ruptures and discontinuities of ‘postcards’,
as ‘hopes’, ‘jokes’, and in the hypostatizations of identity in and across
these incommensurable milieus or jurisdictions, neither quite factual
nor fictional, neither public nor private. I would insist on this void—
call it a generative difference, if you will—and see here the limits of a
materialist disposition, the space or place where materialism falters both
temporally and rhetorically. Indeed, the equivocation of my ‘sites’—and
indeed, their rhythmic temporizations and tropic indiscretions—are
not quite ‘concrete’ problems/matters or materials that yield to a
(legal) new materialist approach. If these spaces appear as ‘concrete’
or ‘material’—if their distance is collapsed rather than held open, as a
wound—this is because we have been seduced by the ruses of technoscience, their promise that ‘the future is now’, and that these futures
are at our material disposal in the present. Law’s materiality, as Kang
(2018) argues, is predicated on ‘multiple representational practices, such
as texts, spatial orderings and ritualised performances’ (456). But the
future remains—the Open—and cannot be ‘materialized’ in the present
as anything but a speculative representation, or projection. Even risk
is not concrete, it defies representation, however much we ‘manage’ it
and hope to control it through statistical probabilities, modelling, etc.
Nor is language the raw material—or tool—of representation, for this
would strip language of its intrinsic powers of rupture and discontinuity,
which are endless. I take seriously Kang’s (2018) claim that ‘Law’s
matters are not always material, and the latter word is meant in the sense
of mattering’ (457). I would like to see this affirmation developed in
legal materialist scholarship because it sits so uncomfortably alongside
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‘new materialist demands for being more attuned to the ways matters
are, act or speak for themselves…’ (457). Even if matter is ‘vibrant’
(Bennett 2009)—a quasi-theological claim—I do not understand
matter as ever speaking ‘for itself ’, it is not the Word, and this marks
another of my (rhetorical) breaks with new materialist ontologies and
so-called ‘postcritique’. Language matters, but matter has no—and is
not—language. And so language is only a ‘materiality’ in a fictional
sense, or as a legal fiction—and these matter, certainly, and sometimes
unto death, but there is no legal account here, no possible account, of
law’s own language, whether material or metaphorical, or of the void
that language takes as its space when law would (and it would that it
could) articulate itself—a neuter it-self—in the nakedness of ‘I speak’.
5 In refrain
By way of refrain, rather than conclusion, I invoke juxtaposing
scenes—or ‘jurisdictions’—from Kundera’s novel: two faces of ‘hope’,
or two openings perhaps, whose tempos and dictions attest to matters
incommensurable. These two aspects are also in tension across the
discursive ‘materialities’ of hope tendered by the fertility industry,
which, much like legal fictions, must be read as speech/acts. In this
reading, hope is a fiction, which is not to say that it is does not matter
but only that it is not matter. By ‘fiction’—and by extension ‘law’—I
absolutely do not mean speech/acts that interiorize or ‘materialize’ a
sovereign subjectivity in the liberal tradition which harkens back to
‘a time when the interiorization of the law of history and the world
was being imperiously demanded by Western consciousness as never
before’ (Foucault 1998: 150). And this is so even as we are enjoined
today to embrace the imperious materiality of subjective identity—
and identity politics—that convenes and seem to materialize in these
fictional places. Rather, in gesturing to our postcards’ correspondence,
and in their temporalities of generation, by ‘fiction’ I intend an opening,
a rhetorical agency, or a
void in which the contentless slimness of ‘I speak’ is manifested … [as]
an absolute opening through which language endlessly spreads forth,
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[and in] which the subject—the ‘I’ who speaks—fragments, disperses,
scatters, disappearing in that naked space. (Foucault 1998: 148)

This nakedness, I contend, is fiction’s hope, its opening and exteriority,
which is not quite the dialectical negation of materiality—for this would
serve only to bring ‘what one negates into the troubled interiority of
the mind’ (Foucault 1998: 152). Here, the two ways that legal new
materialism falters—temporally and rhetorically—come into relation,
without quite (I hope) ceding on hope.
It is fifteen years since Ludvik was excommunicated from the Party
and imprisoned in a labour camp. He is now a free man, but all he
hopes for is to take revenge on those who condemned him so long ago,
especially his former friend and fellow student, Pavel Zemanek, whose
eloquent and spiteful testimony had sealed Ludvik’s fate during his
public ‘trial’. Ludvik’s plan is revenge by proxy: to ravage and possess
something dear to Pavel—a tryst with his wife, Helena. ‘I had dreamed
this plan up with the power of fifteen years of rancor’ (178), he says,
in the troubled interiority of his mind. The plan is set in motion, but
as he awaits the arrival of Helena’s bus, this scene is interrupted by
the appearance of many baby carriages in front of the town’s National
Committee Building. Ludvik is curious, he has time to kill, so—why
not?—he enters.
What he witnesses in details painstakingly portrayed by Kundera is
a highly ritualized—though secular, Communist—mass ‘christening’
or birthrite, officially called ‘a welcoming of new citizens to life’.
On stage, children begin to sing: solitary voices at first, with similar
refrains that syncretize in chorus and draw an equation between babies
and ‘springtime’, ‘roses’, ‘flowers’. ‘All of a sudden one of the boys …
said spring had come and all papas and mamas were rejoicing and the
whole earth was rejoicing’ (170). Another boy ‘proclaimed that children
were peace’ (171). Then a man from the National Committee stands,
in regal garb, and presides over the ceremony—the official in charge
of citizen affairs.
He too spoke of spring, of flowers, of mamas and papas, he also spoke
of love, which according to him bore fruit, but suddenly his vocabulary
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was transformed and the words duty, responsibility, the State, and
citizen appeared; suddenly there was no more papa and mama, but
father and mother, and he was enumerating all the blessings the State
offered them (the fathers and mothers) and reminding them that it was
their duty in return to bring up their children to be model citizens. (171)

Hope here is forcibly materialized in the future responsibilities of
citizenship, the parents’ signatures inscribed as promissory into the
State’s secular book of life (literally hypo-statized), and the young
bodies of these new citizens fetishized as (always-already) material
organs of the proletariat, of the body biopolitic. Obedient to an ‘old’
materialist logic, private property is abolished, subsumed by the State,
made public. Ludvik learns that participation in this ritual was not
compulsory, not officially at least, but ‘the National Committee used
attendance as a touchstone for evaluating people’s sense of citizenship
and their attitude towards the State, and in the end people realized
that and came’ (173).
The coercion of this scene linking matters of sex, future life, and
the ‘concretizations’ of citizenship sits uncomfortably alongside the
subsequent scene of coercion that unfolds in Ludvik’s sexual liaison
with Helena. ‘I was wary of the slightest risk,’ he narrates, ‘afraid to
bungle an opportunity that meant so much to me, not because Helena
was particularly young, particularly nice, or particularly attractive, but
purely and simply because her name was Zemanek and her husband
was a man I hated’ (175). This scene is without its own future, as
Ludvik imagines it, despite what he promises Helena by way of
seduction. The sexual act is invited, not quite forced, but nonetheless
brusque and violent, a ‘beautiful act of demolition’ (196), he says. In
the afterglow, Helena nevertheless professes her undying love and
devotion to Ludvik, and imagines their future together, while he is at
pains to extricate himself. His plan fails, however, not only because his
extrication becomes complicated by Helena’s attempted (but botched)
suicide (she tries to overdose on what turns out to be laxatives), but
because Helena and Pavel had in any case been estranged for several
years, Pavel seeking a divorce and Helena seeking new love. Later,
with some remorse, Ludvik confesses, ‘I had acted vilely, having turned
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her into a mere object, into a stone I had tried (and failed) to throw at
someone else’ (283).

The joke, of course, sometimes enjoys its own fecundity in time,
and like matter (and matters that matter), reproduces and cuts in
more than one direction: ‘that bad joke which, not content with itself,
had gone on monstrously multiplying itself into more and more silly
jokes’ (288). The joke, the fiction, is a generative transmission because
it does not speak in the interiorizing language of self-reflexivity: ‘It
must be directed’, Foucault writes of literature, ‘not toward any inner
confirmation—not toward a kind of central, unshakable certitude—but
toward an outer bound where it must continually content itself ’ (1998:
152). It does not make of identity a materiality; quite the contrary.
‘What if history plays jokes?’ Ludvik asks himself, to which he answers:
‘And then I realized how powerless I was to revoke my own joke when
throughout my life as a whole I was involved in a joke much more vast
(all-embracing for me) and utterly irrevocable’ (288–289). The state’s
‘welcoming’ ritual of citizenship is one such joke, hoping to materialize
that which matters otherwise. Conversely, the ceremonial of Helena’s
‘demolition’—on a body reduced to brute matter, a ‘stone’—mocks sex,
citizenship, and any instantiation of hope or of future. It is not enough,
then, to sovereignly oppose one or the other ‘materialization’, but to
analyse the non-sovereign legal, textual, and cultural fictions at play.
In the interstices, as Foucault was fond of saying, between legal fictions
and legal ‘materialities’, we might begin to read and to problematize
the correspondence between the technologies of law, politics, and
life. In the moment between nostalgia’s past and our techno-scientific
futures, then, and in vocal defiance of both sovereign and biopolitical
diktats, a critical presentism and presentist critique finds its rupture,
its discontinuity: ‘I felt a tiny crack opening up between the person
I had been and the person I should be (according to the spirit of the
times) and tried to be’ (32).
These juxtaposed scenes, finally, represent two ‘laws’ of kinship,
both of which are legal fictions, whether expressly so, as in Kundera, or
more allegorically (but no less really), as we see in the many faces—in
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the hopes and the harms—of the fertility industry. Foucault (1998)
might be said to summarize these two dimensions of law:
If it were self-evident and in the heart, the law would no longer be the
law, but the sweet interiority of consciousness. If, on the other hand,
it were present in a text, if it were possible to decipher it between the
lines of a book, if it were in a register that could be consulted, then
it would have the solidity of external things: it would be possible to
follow or disobey it. Where then would its power reside, by what force
or prestige would it command respect? (157)

The first is not law, Foucault says, and yet without the first the second
is senseless. To obey or disobey, to respect or disrespect, are also matters
of the heart, of one’s conscience—that without which matter does not
and cannot matter. In Kundera’s scenes, the intimate ritual of Helena’s
‘demolition’ is for her a matter of the heart, whereas for Ludvik it is a
‘vile’ material act. Nevertheless, for each the act is a matter of hopes that
are held and that promise to hold open futures calibrated according to
the kinship of love (for Helena) or of hate (for Ludvik), even if these
particular futures are fated never to materialize. Hope’s futures have
their dark and atavistic dimensions, also (but not just) matters of the
heart, and in and by which ‘hope’ is tendered, there, where subjects and
subject matters are at times violently fragmented, dispersed, scattered,
and disappear in the shadows. In the correspondence between Kundera’s
two scenes (which fiction invites but does not force), matters of ‘the
heart’ do not underwrite or secure the legal materiality of ‘external
things’; rather, the correspondence only underscores law’s fictionality,
its joke. The ritual of ‘welcoming new citizens to life’ is a political
charade and does not, for all its ceremoniousness, command respect or
obedience; an instability guardedly masked as a fictive stability, it also
cannot bridge the axes of political identity or communal life. Law, as
fiction, folds back upon itself, fugally—both fleeing and pursuing: ‘The
law is the shadow toward which every gesture necessarily advances;
it is itself the shadow of the advancing gesture’ (Foucault 1998: 158).
Kundera’s ‘old’ materialist scene of state-sanctioned fertility shadows,
today, in parody perhaps, the ritualized market-driven economies of
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the fertility industry, which supplant Communist onto-logics with
Neoliberal and ‘new’ materialist ones—a joke that history is playing on
us. Together, their ceremonials signal, and hope to secure, a future that
their performances nevertheless belie as both anxious and uncertain,
even paranoid, their solemn disavowals notwithstanding. And it is
perhaps this latter correspondence, itself something of a joke, an ironic
transmission, that calls forth in my reading some furtive hope.
Endnotes
1. Subsequent references to Kundera’s novel will cite page numbers only.

2. Legal scholars seeking a ‘bloodier’ case study—with its numerous legal
battles—need look no further than the Theranos debacle. As the US
Securities and Exchange Commission attests, Theranos investors were
defrauded out of vast sums of money for nearly a decade (see www.sec.
gov/news/press-release/2018-41). Everything I claim concerning the
speculative futures of neoliberalism and biotech applies to this case as well.
I thank Michael Dorland for bringing this to my attention.
3. I thank Tad Lemieux for bringing this text to my attention and for helping
me to think more critically about temporality, rhythmicity, and not least,
‘the joke’ (see Murray and Lemieux 2019).
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